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Life or Death: The Voluntariness of Guilty Pleas by
Capital Defendants and the New York Perspective
INTRODUCTION*
The will to survive is a powerful instinct. If a person's life is
on the line, he or she will do anything to save it. No less of a standard
is true for a criminal defendant facing possible execution. For capital
defendants, this desperation may cause them to enter into plea
agreements with prosecutors in exchange for less severe sentences,
raising the question of whether defendants who face capital
punishment voluntarily plead guilty.1 One can even argue that most
guilty pleas entered in exchange for a more lenient sentence are, in
fact, involuntary.2 Regardless of whether they are guilty or desire to
contest the strength of the Government's case against them before a
jury, criminal defendants may plead guilty solely to avoid the death
penalty. 3 As the United States Supreme Court stated in Woodson v.
North Carolina, "death is different;",4 therefore, should all pleas in
* I would like to thank Jacqueline Linares and Kyle Reeves, both Senior
Assistant District Attorneys with the Kings County District Attorney's office, for the
thoughtful and practical insight they conveyed to me concerning the issues discussed in
this note.
See HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 11 (1982)
(stating that the certainty of the defendant's death sentence after being convicted by a jury
is a powerful tool for prosecutors in the plea bargaining process and also an incentive for
the defendant to avoid trial by pleading guilty to a lesser crime); see also United States v.
Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (confronting the issue of whether a plea of guilty proffered
in order to escape the death penalty is voluntary and intelligent).
2 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 70-74 (1988) (arguing
that offering a defendant a lesser sentence than that which he or she would receive after
trial has a "coercive effect"). Schulhofer compares plea bargaining to robbery, in which
the robber states, "your money or your life." Id. In both the robbery and the plea bargain,
you are asked to give up something you have a right to; your money in the robbery-your
right to a jury trial in the plea bargain. Id. at 70. Generally, for this reason, Shulhofer
argues that the "rational choice" to plead guilty may be considered coerced. Id. Compare
United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 209-10 (1995). The Court stated that a guilty
plea cannot be deemed coercive because difficult decisions are involved, even if there was
undue leverage during plea negotiations. Id. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809
(1970) (forwarding that both the prosecutor and defendant stand on equal ground during
plea negotiations).
3 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
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capital cases be placed under a much stronger microscope than those
in other cases?
Our criminal justice system presumes a defendant innocent
until proven guilty. 5  It requires that defendants enter guilty pleas
intelligently and voluntarily.6 In a criminal justice system that relies
heavily on the plea bargaining process to alleviate its increasing
caseload, plea bargaining in capital cases has led to many
controversial issues. The United States Supreme Court has questioned
whether our constitution is flexible enough to allow for the imposition
of a death sentence upon the exercise of certain constitutional rights.
7
This note will focus on the issues surrounding plea bargaining
in capital cases and how they may impede upon certain rights, namely
those under the Fifth8 and Sixth Amendments of the United States
Constitution. 9 The first section will review prior decisions by the
United States Supreme Court concerning plea bargaining by capital
defendants and how the lower federal courts followed them.10 The
second section will explain how the individual states have reacted to
and grappled with the United States Supreme Court's various rulings
on plea bargaining by capital defendants and their attempts to conform
to those rulings.11 The third section will discuss the current situation
in New York and how New York's recently enacted Death Penalty
4 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion). See also Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (stating that "death as a
punishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability"); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349
(1977) (plurality opinion); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). All of the fore-
mentioned cases support the proposition that the death penalty should be held to a much
higher standard than other areas of our law because death is an irreversible penalty.
5 See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1894) (stressing the importance
of the presumption of innocence in our criminal justice system by declaring it "undoubted
law, axiomatic, and elementary, and its enforcement lies at [our system's] foundation").
6 See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969) (holding that a guilty
plea is not voluntary unless entered into with an "understanding of the law in relation to
the facts," or in other words, the plea must necessarily be "voluntary and knowing").
7 See generally Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581.
8 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V (commanding that "[n]o person shall
... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself... ").
9 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating that "[i]n all criminal
proceeding, the accused shall enjoy the right to... trial, by an impartial jury..
10 See infra notes 14-118 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 119-181 and accompanying text.
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Statute has fallen prey to the judicial ax of that state's highest court
because of its plea bargaining provision's failure to comply with
constitutional mandates.1 2 In its conclusion, this note will discuss the
aftermath of the New York decision and possible solutions that may
allow the death penalty and plea-bargaining to co-exist.
13
I. THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE ISSUE OF PLEA BARGAINING IN
CAPITAL CASES
A. Background of Plea Bargaining and Standards for Guilty Pleas
Plea-bargaining is a common occurrence in criminal
proceedings. 14 The practice is authorized under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. 15 Often a defendant pleads guilty to a lower
count of an indictment in exchange for a more lenient sentence. 6 The
sentence agreed to is almost always less severe than that which would
have been imposed were the defendant convicted of the indictment's
top count after trial. 17 A court must affirmatively find, on the record,
12 See infra notes 183-227 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 228-233 and accompanying text.
14 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN
COUNTIES, 1992, 29 (1992) (providing that approximately ninety-two percent of all
criminal convictions on the state level in seventy five of the most populous counties in the
United States were the product of plea bargaining). See Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Should
We Really "Ban" Plea Bargaining?: The Core Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47
EMORY L.J. 753 (1998) for a discussion of the impact of plea bargaining on our criminal
justice system.
15 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (authorizing plea agreements within the federal
court system and setting forth procedures which a court must follow prior to accepting a
defendant's guilty plea).
16 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1153 (6th ed. 1990) (defining plea
bargaining as "the process whereby the accused and the prosecutor in a criminal case
work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval . ..
usually involv[ing] the defendant pleading guilty to a lesser offence or some of the counts
of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that possible for the
graver charge").
17 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (authorizing plea agreements when a defendant
pleads guilty to a lesser or related crime).
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that a guilty plea was made knowingly and voluntarily.' 8  Prior to
accepting a guilty plea, a court must determine the voluntariness of
such plea agreements in light of all the surrounding circumstances. 9
Consequently, when a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the
court intensely scrutinizes the plea before accepting it.
20
A defendant may face the death penalty if convicted by a jury
of a capital crime. 2' Prosecutors have been known to use the death
penalty as a tactic in plea bargaining and often offer a capital
defendant the opportunity to plead to Second Degree Murder, thereby
avoiding the death penalty.2 2 Those opposed to plea bargaining by
capital defendants argue that the weight of a possible death sentence
plays in the mind of a capital defendant, adversely affecting the
voluntary nature of such pleas23 and impeding upon that defendant's
right to contest his or her guilt before a jury.24
A guilty plea involves the waiver of both the right against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment and the right to a trial by
jury under the Sixth Amendment.2 5 In order for a criminal defendant
to waive any constitutional right, it must be shown that the waiver was
18 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (holding that it must be shown on
the record, that a guilty plea was intelligently and voluntarily made; that a defendant was
informed by the court of his constitutional rights which include the Fifth Amendment's
protection against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial and the right to
confront his accusers prior to entering such a plea).
19 See id.; United States v. McCarthy, 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
20 See text accompanying infra notes 26-32 (setting forth some of the
conditions which a court must inquire into prior to accepting a guilty plea).
2! BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1996, 3-4 (1997)
(listing the federal and state crimes punishable by death).
22 See Richard C. Dieter, Ethical Choices for Attorneys Whose Clients Elect
Execution, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS. 799, 804 (1990) (suggesting that prosecutor's
intentions to seek the death penalty is at times used solely for the purpose of giving the
prosecutor undue leverage in plea negotiations).
23 See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968) (deciding "whether
the constitution permits such a death penalty, applicable to those who assert their right to
contest their guilt before a jury[,]" and therefore discourages the Fifth Amendment right
not to plead guilty).
24 Id. (holding that the death penalty provision in the Federal Kidnapping
Statute was unconstitutional because its sentencing scheme needlessly deterred a criminal
defendant from exercising his or her Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial as a death
sentence may only be imposed upon a jury's recommendation).
25 U.S. CONST. amends. V & VI.
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intelligently and voluntarily made.26 The standard for pleading guilty
in all criminal cases is the same as the standard for adjudging whether
a defendant is competent to stand trial.27  When determining
competency, the trial court must decide whether a criminal defendant
has the ability to consult with his or her lawyer, has a factual
understanding of both the charges against him or her and the nature of
the proceedings surrounding him or her.28 In applying such a standard
to guilty pleas, Godinez v. Moran held that in addition to finding the
defendant competent to stand trial, a court must also find that the
defendant made a voluntary and intelligent waiver of his
constitutional rights.
29
Entering a guilty plea is considered an admission to the crimes
charged.3° In tackling the issue of whether a guilty plea was voluntary
and intelligently made by the defendant, a court often holds such pleas
to the same standard of confessions. 31 Taking this action one step
further, the Court held in Bram v. United States that for a confession
to be admissible, the government must show that it was given freely
26 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
27 See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (holding that the standard for
competency to stand trial is the same for entering a guilty plea). See also Dusky v. United
States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (proclaiming the standard for competency to stand trial is
whether the defendant "has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him").
28 See Godinez, 509 U.S. 389 (holding that before a criminal defendant may
enter a plea of guilty, the court must find that the defendant has the present ability to
consent with counsel and has both a rational understanding of the charges against him and
the proceeding surrounding him).
29 Id. (adding that a court must find that prior to pleading guilty, the
defendant is voluntarily and intelligently waiving his or her constitutional rights, namely
his or her privilege against self-incrimination, right to a trial by jury, and the right to
confront his or her accusers).
30 See generally McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 459 (suggesting that a guilty plea
usually contains a confession to the acts committed and crimes charged). Compare North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (allowing guilty pleas by defendants who protest
their innocence but only plead guilty to a lesser offence because of the high risk of
conviction after trial).
31 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970) (comparing the plea
entered into by defendant in the current case to the standards set forth for confessions in
Bram v. United States).
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and voluntarily. 32
B. The Supreme Court's Confrontation with the Issue and Subsequent
Decisions
The Supreme Court's first confrontation with the issues
surrounding the possible coercive nature of the death penalty during
plea negotiations with capital defendants was in United States v.
Jackson.33 Under the sentencing scheme of the Federal Kidnapping
Statute at issue in Jackson, a capital defendant only faced the
possibility of a death sentence if convicted by a jury after trial.34 The
trial judge could neither have imposed the death penalty after a bench
trial nor could the defendant have pled guilty to a sentence of death.35
The Supreme Court needed to decide "whether the constitution
permits the establishment of such a death penalty, applicable only to
those defendants who assert their right to contest their guilt before a
jury.,36 The Supreme Court subsequently held that the death penalty
provision of the sentencing scheme in question, "imposes an
impermissible burden upon the exercise of a constitutional right,"
namely the defendant's right to have his or her guilt determined by a
jury after trial.37
32 See Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897); see also Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964) (stating the holding of Brain to be applicable to the individual states).
31 See 390 U.S. 570 (deciding whether a defendant who pled guilty to charges
under the Federal Kidnapping Statute, where the death penalty could only be imposed
after a jury trial, did so voluntarily).
34 Id. (explaining that a defendant charged under the Federal Kidnapping
Statute had three options: (1) plead guilty to a sentence other than death; (2) choose a
bench trial in which the highest penalty he could receive would be a life sentence; or (3)
elect a jury trial where he would face a possible death sentence).
35 Id. (explaining that under the sentencing scheme of the Federal Kidnapping
Statute at issue, a capital defendant could not be sentenced to death upon receiving a
conviction for capital murder after a bench trial).
36 Id at 581 (inferring that the sentencing scheme in question discouraged
defendants from asserting their Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty as well as their
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial).
37 See id. at 572 (stating that under the sentencing scheme of the Federal
Kidnapping Statute, the death penalty may only be imposed upon a jury's
recommendation and therefore the risk of death was the price to pay for exercising your
right to a jury trial). See also Pope v. United States, 392 U.S. 651 (1968) (declaring the
sentencing scheme of the Federal Bank Robbery act unconstitutional for the same reasons
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The Supreme Court was confronted with a situation in which a
defendant who decides not to contest his guilt before a jury is assured
that he will not be executed, while one who seeks an acquittal by a
jury "stands forewarned that, if the jury finds him guilty, and does not
wish to spare his life, he will die." 38 Justice Stewart, writing for the
majority, found that even though it may not have been the intention of
the sentencing scheme to coerce guilty pleas and jury waivers,39 the
depravity of such a design rested in its encouragement of such pleas.
40
The Court held that the imposition of the death penalty, only after a
jury trial, "needlessly chilled" the exercise of certain constitutional
rights.41 It was this needless encouragement of jury waivers and
guilty pleas that forced the Court to declare the sentencing scheme of
the Federal Kidnapping Statute unconstitutional.42 It is obvious that
Justice Stewart found that the death penalty facilitated plea
bargaining, thereby adversely affecting the voluntary nature of guilty
pleas by capital defendants.
Justice Stewart's main focus in Jackson concerned the outline
of the Federal Kidnapping Statute's sentencing scheme. Condoning
such a scheme may have led to future construction of criminal statutes
with similar frameworks, thus generating numerous laws that
needlessly encouraged the waiver of guaranteed rights.43 Even though
the death penalty was found to affect the voluntariness of guilty pleas,
the Court nonetheless appeared more concerned with the structure of
set forth in Jackson). The Federal Bank Robbery Act contained the same sentencing
scheme as the Federal Kidnapping Statute, which was declared unconstitutional in
Jackson. Id.
38 See Jackson, 390 U.S. at 581 (explaining how under the sentencing scheme
of the Federal Kidnapping Statute, a capital defendant who pled guilty will receive a
maximum penalty of life in prison, while the defendant who is convicted after a jury trial
may be sentenced to death).
39 Id. at 582 (suggesting that Congress, when constructing the Federal
Kidnapping Statute at issue, probably did not intend for its capital sentencing scheme to
impinge upon certain constitutional rights).
40 Id. at 583 (finding that the impingement on certain constitutional rights by
the imposition of a statute need not have been the intention of Congress in enacting the
statute; it is only the result of the statute that matters).
41 Id. at 582.
42 id.
43 This proposition was later urged by Justice Brennan when he dissented in
Brady v. United Sates, 397 U.S. 790 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
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the statute, and how that structure impeded upon certain constitutional
rights, and not how the death penalty was per se coercive.
Two years later, the Supreme Court in Brady v. United States
held that a guilty plea made under the Federal Kidnapping Statue, the
same statute at issue in Jackson, was made voluntarily.44  The
defendant was charged under the Federal Kidnapping Statute and was,
therefore, susceptible to the same sentencing scheme found
unconstitutional in Jackson.45 The defendant, Brady, entered his plea
of guilty in 1959, but it was not until 1967 that he brought an appeal
challenging the voluntariness of his plea hoping the Court would give
retroactive effect to Jackson.46 In moving away from Jackson, Justice
White in Brady stated that a guilty plea was voluntary regardless of
whether it was entered into solely to avoid a possible death sentence.47
Rather than simply denying retroactive enforcement of Jackson, the
court expressly denied holding "that a guilty plea [is automatically]
invalid under the Fifth Amendment whenever motivated by the
defendant's desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser
penalty rather than face" the most severe penalty allowed under the
law, which may include death.48
Nonetheless, Justice White acknowledged that offers of mercy
in exchange for guilty pleas might greatly increase the likelihood of
possible innocent defendants condemning themselves.49  However,
Justice White went on to note that a "state may not produce a plea by
actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing
the defendant." 50  Although the death penalty may be considered
44 397 U.S. 742 (holding a plea of guilty is not invalid solely because it was
entered into to avoid a possible death sentence).
45 Id. (explaining that the defendant, like the defendant in Jackson, was
charged with violating the Federal Kidnapping Statute).
46 Id. (stating the dates of Brady's guilty plea and his subsequent appeal,
which claimed that plea to be involuntary).
47 Id. at 744. Justice White also wrote the dissenting opinion in United States
v. Jackson. 390 U.S 570, 591 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
48 See id. at 751 (proclaiming that a plea of guilty entered solely in order to
avoid the death penalty is not involuntary as a matter of law).
4' Brady, 397 U.S. at 758 (hinting at a contrary decision if it could be shown
that innocent defendants would plead guilty in order to avoid a possible death sentence).
50 Id. at 750 (inferring that for a guilty plea to be rendered voluntary, that plea
must not have been the product of threats or mental coercion on behalf of the State).
706 [Vol. XVI
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physical harm, some suggest that Justice White meant physical harm
not authorized by law.
51
In further distinguishing this case from Jackson, the Court
stated that Brady may have pled guilty solely because his chances for
acquittal were low, therefore finding the death penalty to be a "but
for" cause of his guilty plea.5 2 Brady's co-defendant had previously
pled guilty and agreed to testify against him.5 3 Justice White stated
Brady must have been able to show that he was so overwhelmed by
the fear that the death penalty will be imposed and that he lacked any
hope for leniency "that he did not or could not, with the help of
counsel, rationally weigh the advantages of going to trial against the
advantages of pleading guilty." 54  Therefore, the fear of the death
penalty must destroy the rational thinking of all capital defendants for
their pleas to be declared involuntary. 55 However, Justice Stewart in
Jackson did not state that impinging upon a criminal defendant's
constitutional rights arose from the immense fear instilled by the death
penalty. 6 Rather, he stated that the evil in the death penalty provision
of the Federal Kidnapping Statute "is not that it necessarily coerced
guilty pleas and jury waivers but simply that it needlessly encouraged
them. 57 This appears to be a far lower standard than which the court
51 See Loftus E. Becker, Jr., Plea Bargaining and the Supreme Court, 21
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 757, 800 (1988) (suggesting that the Supreme Court in prohibiting the
use of physical harm in obtaining guilty pleas, meant to distinguish a conditional versus
an unconditional threat). Physical harm was meant to be defined as that which is not
authorized by law or as punishment upon conviction. Id.
52 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 750 (stating that the defendant may have only
entered a guilty plea because of the strength of the case against him, and even if the
Supreme Court was to assume that the death penalty provision played a role in his
decision to plead guilty, it was merely a factor which led to his plea).5 3 id.
54 Id. at 750 (setting forth the level of influence the death penalty must exert
over a capital defendant for that defendant's plea to be rendered involuntary); compare
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (stating that the death penalty induced
guilty pleas and making no mention of the level of fear that a capital defendant must
display prior to pleading guilty for their plea to be considered coerced).
" See Brady, 397 U.S. 742 (concluding by inference that fear of the death
penalty influences guilty pleas by capital defendants).
56 See generally Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 (stating that the evil of the death
penalty declared in Jackson was not that it was coercive per se, but that the death penalty
needlessly encouraged defendants to plead guilty, and waive certain constitutional rights).
" Id. at 583.
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imposed in Brady.
Justice White, however, appeared far more concerned with the
guilty plea itself, and not with the statutory scheme under which it
was entered into. He held that since a guilty plea made under the
threat of a possible execution can never be voluntarily entered into, it
should be removed as an option from all capital defendants. As a
result, defendants facing a possible death sentence would be forced to
go to trial. Courts rely heavily on plea bargaining58 and therefore are
hesitant to make rulings that would limit its availability.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan urged that "if a defendant can
demonstrate that the death penalty scheme exercised a significant
influence upon his decision to plead guilty, then, under Jackson," he
should be entitled to a reversal of his conviction because of the
"illicitly produced plea."59 Furthermore, Justice Brennan stated that,
by enacting the sentencing schemes similar to those of the Federal
Kidnapping Statute, legislatures are rewarding defendants who plead
guilty, while punishing, with death, those who exercise their
constitutional rights.6 °
The Court continued to show its desire to protect plea
bargaining in North Carolina v. A/ford when it held that a capital
defendant could plead guilty without even acknowledging his guilt.
61
The Supreme Court stated that where a capital defendant pleads guilty
only to avoid the death penalty, the plea is not made in violation of the
58 See generally Guidorizzi, supra note 14.
59 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 790, 808 (1970) (dissenting opinion)
(suggesting an increased standard for declaring a guilty plea invalid on the basis of
involuntariness); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970) (holding a guilty plea
was voluntarily given when the prosecutor offered a sentence which was less than what a
jury could impose after trial); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). Both Parker
and McMann were decided the same day as Brady and have later become known as the
"Brady Trilogy." In McMann, the defendant argued that his guilty plea was invalid
because his confession was involuntarily given. The Court rejected this argument. Id.
60 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 805 (stating in sentencing schemes such as the one
at issue, "the legislature has promised the accused that he will receive a substantially
reduced penalty if he pleads guilty and simultaneously threatens the accused with the
ultimate penalty - death - if he insists upon a jury trial").
61 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (holding that a guilty plea made solely to avoid the
death penalty represented a voluntary and intelligent choice by a defendant). Where the
defendant is represented by competent counsel, there is no violation of Fifth Amendment
rights. Id.
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Fifth Amendment if it represented a voluntary and intelligent choice
made by the defendant after considering all of the alternatives
available to him.62  However, the court will only allow a capital
defendant to plead guilty and still maintain his innocence, if it is
obvious from the evidence that the defendant is guilty and is only
entering such a plea because of the strong case against him.63 In
Alford, the defendant faced a possible death sentence upon a jury
verdict convicting him of capital murder.64 The defendant in A/ford
claimed that his plea of guilty was invalid because it was the product
of coercion and fear instilled by the possibility of execution.
65
In stating that the trial court made no constitutional error in
accepting A/ford's guilty plea, despite his proclaimed innocence, the
Court relied on Brady to sidestep Jackson. The Court stated that
Brady held that a plea of guilty made solely to avoid the death penalty
and, to limit the penalty imposed to imprisonment, is not made in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. 66 The Court further stated that if
the defendant could establish that he or she would not have pled guilty
"but for" the opportunity to limit the possible penalty alone, the plea
would not be held invalid.67 However, such a defendant must be
represented by competent counsel who, in fact, could have advised the
defendant that his or her best choice was to plead guilty.
68
It appears that so long as a defendant enters a plea of guilty
knowingly and voluntarily, it is a valid plea, regardless of whether it
was proffered solely to avoid the death penalty. No longer is it
important that the death penalty may needlessly encourage guilty
pleas and jury waivers if capital defendants are able to communicate
with their lawyer and are cognizant of the consequences of such a
plea.69 After Brady, the death penalty is not per se coercive, it is
62 id.
63 See id. (stating that an overwhelming presence of guilt must be apparent
for defendants to plead guilty while simultaneously maintaining their innocence).
64 id.
65 See A/ford, 400 U.S. at 29.
66 See A/ford, 400 U.S. at 31 (reinforcing the holding of Brady).
67 See id. (commanding a higher standard for declaring a guilty plea to be
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merely a factor that must be considered in determining the
voluntariness of guilty pleas by capital defendants.
Jackson dealt with the statutory sentencing scheme under
which the death penalty may be imposed upon a plea of guilty.
Meanwhile, Brady appeared to concentrate solely on guilty pleas
made by capital defendants. The distinction here makes no difference.
Regardless of what the sentencing scheme provides, a capital
defendant may still plead guilty solely to avoid the death penalty.
Nonetheless, courts are more inclined to proscribe rules which
legislatures must follow in order to construct constitutionally viable
statutes, as was done in Jackson. At the same time, they are less
likely to vacate a final determination of guilt, as was done in Brady.70
Death, however, is unlike any other punishment. 71 A defendant may
enter a plea of guilty in order to avoid the possibility of the death
penalty, without any regard to the strength of the government's case.
Therefore, all such pleas should be evaluated in the same matter,
regardless of which sentencing scheme it was made under.
C. The Aftermath and the Reactions of the Lower Federal Courts
In the years following the Supreme Court's decisions
concerning plea bargaining in capital cases, the various lower federal
courts implemented differing techniques in attempting to find some
sort of middle ground.72 Courts wanted to encourage plea bargaining
in most cases. 73 In not wanting to withdraw this option from capital
70 Brady's likelihood for conviction may have appeared to have been great
and, therefore, it can be argued that pleading guilty was advantageous to him, limiting the
coercive nature of the death penalty.
71 See cases cited supra note 3.
72 See Runge v. United States, 427 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1970) (holding that the
death penalty is not inherently coercive and suggesting that the level of fear that a capital
defendant may feel may affect the voluntariness of that plea); compare Bostick v. Craven,
429 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding that pleading guilty solely to avoid the death penalty
does not automatically render that plea involuntary); Parker v. United States, 433 F.2d. 15
(1971).
73 See generally Guidorizzi, supra note 14, at 777 (explaining the outcry from
critics and the court after the Bronx County District Attorney declared that he will no
longer plea bargain with felony defendants, claiming that it would cause jail




defendants, courts have consequently struggled with the issues arising
from capital cases even in the wake of Jackson and Brady. Even so,
the lower federal courts have felt bound by Brady and have repeatedly
upheld guilty pleas by capital defendants.
Opponents suggest that the option to plead guilty should be
removed from all capital defendants. 74 Such a drastic measure will
not induce a capital defendant to sacrifice any constitutionally
guaranteed rights. As a consequence of such action, capital
defendants would be forced to trial "however strong their desire is to
acknowledge" their guilt in order to forego the stress of a trial upon
themselves and their families.75
In attempting to find a middle ground, the federal circuit
courts appeared to have considered the death penalty as only one of
many factors affecting the voluntariness of a guilty plea. However,
lower courts have refused to allow the death penalty to be
determinative of involuntariness. The circuit courts appeared to be
more concerned with whether the defendant made a valid guilty plea,
not whether the statute at issue unnecessarily coerced the plea.
Therefore, they were compelled to follow Brady. The holding of
Brady has afforded them the reasons for allowing plea bargaining in
capital cases without giving serious weight to the issues discussed in
Jackson. The lower courts have tended to treat the holding of Jackson
as suggestive and not determinative of the duress that may be imposed
by the death penalty upon a capital defendant prior to pleading
guilty.7
6
For example, in 1970 the Tenth Circuit was confronted with
the same fact pattern that was at issue in Brady.77 The defendant in
Runge v. United States contended that his plea was unduly influenced
because of the possible imposition of the death penalty only after a
74 See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 584 (1968); see also text
accompanying infra note 144 (predicting an increase in executions if the option to plead
guilty was removed by the Supreme Court from all capital defendants).
71 See id.
76 See Wilson v. North Carolina, 429 F.2d. 622, 624-25 (4th Cir. 1970)
(stating that Jackson was limited by Brady and Parker).
77 See Runge, 427 F.2d 122, 125 (stating that like Brady, Runge, charged
under the Federal Kidnapping Statute, had pled guilty prior to Jackson, and it was not
until Jackson was decided that he claimed his guilty plea to be involuntary).
71120001
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jury trial.78 The Tenth Circuit admitted to the coercive nature of the
death penalty but held it to be just one factor that must be considered
in determining the voluntariness of a guilty plea.79
The defendant in Runge, like the defendant in Brady,
suggested that Jackson held that all guilty pleas under the death
Cpenalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Statute were needlessly
encouraged and are compelled when the apprehension of death is
shown to be a factor in the plea. 80 Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit was
bound by Brady.81 The court found that the death penalty was not
inherently coercive, but merely persuasive, therefore, not all guilty
pleas are invalid. 2 However, the court hinted that they may have
found the proffered guilty plea involuntary if there was compelling
evidence that Runge was so controlled by the fear of receiving the
death penalty that it prevented him from making an intelligent plea of
guilty.83
Again, in 1970, the Fourth Circuit held a guilty plea was valid
when entered solely for the purpose of avoiding the death penalty.
84
In Wilson v. North Carolina, the defendant faced the death penalty
only upon a jury verdict and, subsequently pled guilty.85  The
defendant claimed he only pled guilty in order to avoid the death
penalty. 86 The Fourth Circuit interpreted Brady and Parker to allow
guilty pleas entered solely for limiting the possible penalty to less than
what could be imposed upon by jury convicting the defendant of the
78 See id. (setting forth the defendant's argument that his guilty plea is invalid
because it was entered solely to avoid the death penalty after a jury trial). The death
penalty could not have been imposed upon a plea of guilty. Id.
79 See id.
80 See id. at 126.
81 See Runge, 427 F.2d 122 (stating how the Court was able to support its
rejection of Jackson by interpreting Brady to hold that the death penalty is merely
persuasive, and does not render all pleas by capital defendants involuntary).
82 See id.
83 See id. Compare Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970)
(suggesting that in order for the death penalty to render a guilty plea involuntary, a
defendant must be so consumed with the fear of the death penalty that he cannot
communicate with his attorney and weigh the advantages of going to trial).
84 See Wilson, 429 F.2d 622, 626.
85 See id. at 625 (setting forth the circumstances surrounding the defendant's
guilty plea).
86 See id. at 623.
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highest count. 87 The Fourth Circuit stated that the holdings of Brady
and Parker rejected Jackson's claim that all guilty pleas are invalid
when entered to escape the possibility of a death sentence, and when
the death penalty could only be imposed after a jury trial.88 In
construing the law in such a way and finding the defendant had
effective assistance of counsel, the Fourth Circuit upheld Wilson's
guilty plea as voluntary regardless of whether it was entered solely to
escape the death penalty. 8
9
1. Drawing an Even Harder Line
Other lower federal courts have held that even if the death
penalty was the only reason a capital defendant pled guilty, this reason
alone is not enough to hold that a plea is involuntarily made.90 Many
lower courts embrace the practice of plea-bargaining even at the risk
of jeopardizing the basic principles that underlie it.91 This is best
exemplified in the various applications of Brady and the degree of
influence the death penalty was given in deciding whether a capital
defendant entered a valid guilty plea in the following circuit court
decisions.
In 1970, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit confronted
the issue of plea bargaining in capital cases in Bostick v. Craven.92
The defendant pled guilty in exchange for a sentence of life
" See id. at 624.
88 See Wilson, 429 F2d at 624-25.
89 See id at 626 (finding that all the surrounding circumstances, including
Wilson's ability to consult with his attorney, rendered Wilson's plea voluntary); cf
United States v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
90 See Robinson v. United States, 444 F.2d 1394 (7th Cir. 1971); see also Lott
v. Mancusi, 325 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Compare Tiller v. Cox, 313 F. Supp.
400 (W.D.Va. 1970) (holding that a plea is not involuntary solely because the law
imposes the threat of the death penalty). The defendant, Tiller, claimed at the preliminary
hearing that the only reason he pled guilty was to avoid the electric chair, and thus his
plea was involuntary. Id.
91 See generally Roland Acevedo, Is a Ban on Plea Bargaining an Ethical
Abuse of Discretion? A Bronx County, New York Case Study, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 987
(1995) (describing the advantages experienced by the court, prosecutors, defense
attorneys and defendants through the practice of plea bargaining while it is said to
circumvent the trial process and those rights which every criminal defendant enjoys).
92 429 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1970).
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imprisonment after being advised by counsel of the strength of both
the case against him and the certainty of receiving the death penalty if
convicted by a jury.93 The court quickly disposed of this issue by
following Brady, and subsequently found that a guilty plea is not
involuntary if entered into solely to avoid a death sentence.94 The
court further found that this defendant's guilty plea was knowingly
and voluntarily made because the defendant was fully questioned by
the court prior to entering into the plea agreement.95  The court,
therefore, found the death penalty to be a "but for" cause of' the
defendant's guilty plea. The court did not take into account the
possibility that the death penalty needlessly encouraged the plea and,
therefore, impeded upon the defendant's right to a jury trial.96 Bound
by Brady, the court was compelled to treat this situation like a plea
agreement in any other criminal case.
Again, in Robinson v. United States, decided in 1971, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a guilty plea was
still voluntary, even if the only reason the defendant pled guilty was
the presence of the death penalty in the statute.97 Robinson pled guilty
to First-Degree Murder in exchange for a sentence of life in prison.98
The defendant later claimed on appeal that his plea was involuntarily
entered into because of the presence of the death penalty in the
statute. 99 The court followed Brady, stating that a new standard for
judging the validity of guilty pleas in capital cases had not been
created by the decisions in Jackson and Pope.100 They repeated the
93 See id. at 24.
94 See id.
95 See id.
96 See generally Craven, 429 F.2d 23. Compare United States v. Jackson,
390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968) (stating the evil derived from the imposition of the death
penalty only after a jury conviction came from its needless encouragement of guilty pleas
and jury waivers).
97 See Robinson v. United States, 444 F.2d 1394 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding that
the mere presence of the death penalty in a statute does not make a guilty plea
involuntary).
98 See id (setting forth the circumstances surrounding the defendant's guilty
plea).
99 See id (stating the reasons set forth on appeal by the defendant to support
his contention that his guilty plea was involuntary).
0 See id. at 1395 (interpreting the decisions of Brady, Parker and Alford as
stating, "Jackson prohibits the imposition of the death penalty under Sec. 1201(a), but
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standard that guilty pleas are valid if both intelligently and voluntarily
made. 101
In 1973, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit went on
to hold in Moore v. Swenson that -even the remote possibility of the
imposition of a death penalty upon a jury verdict did not in and of
itself render a guilty plea involuntary.'0 2 In making the possibility of
receiving the death penalty a reality, a codefendant was previously
found guilty after a jury trial and sentenced to death. 10 3 The court
found it obvious that the defendant pled guilty in order to avoid a
possible death sentence, should the jury have convicted him of capital
murder. ' 0
4
This increased possibility of receiving the death penalty
obviously gave the prosecution undue leverage during the plea
bargaining process. Nonetheless, the court went on to state that guilty
pleas entered into by defendants for the sole purpose of avoiding the
death penalty, do not require such pleas be declared involuntary.
10 5
Citing Brady, the court ultimately found that since the defendant was
not gripped with the fear of the death penalty, he was able to
communicate with his attorney and was made aware of the
consequences of his plea agreement.10 6 For these reasons, the court
found the plea to be valid. 07 Again, a circuit court was compelled by
Brady to uphold a guilty plea entered into solely to avoid possible
execution.
that decision neither fashioned a new standard for judging the validity of guilty pleas nor
mandated a new application of the test theretofore fashioned by courts and since reiterated
that guilty pleas are valid if both 'voluntary' and 'intelligent'.").
101 See Robinson, 444 F.2d 1394.
102 See Moore v. Swenson, 487 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1973) (finding that the
defendant's guilty plea to the crimes of First Degree Murder and First Degree Robbery
were valid because the defendant was fully advised by counsel and made aware of the
consequence of such pleas).
'03 See id. at 1021.
4 See id.
'o' See Moore, 487 F.2d at 1021; see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742, 750 (1970) (providing that the death penalty must completely overwhelm a capital
defendant so that the defendant could not possibly communicate with his attorney or
comprehend the nature of both the charges against him and the proceeding surrounding
him).
106 See Moore, 487 F.2d at 1021.
107 See id.
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Brady continues to hold greater precedential value than
Jackson in the circuit court decisions of today. In Parrish v.
Fulcomer, the Third Circuit recently held that there is no due process
violation where a capital defendant waives his right to a jury trial in
exchange for the State's promise not to pursue the death penalty.1
0 8
Parrish involved a defendant's election of a bench trial over a jury
trial in order to avoid the death penalty. 109 The defendant claimed that
Jackson was binding and his waiver of a jury trial should be rendered
invalid. 10 Nonetheless, the court felt compelled to decide this case
under the guise of Brady and Jackson."' The court stated the holding
of Jackson to be that the inevitable result of the Federal Kidnapping
Statute's sentencing provision was that it "excessively deter[ed]" the
defendant from exercising his constitutional right to a jury trial."12
In order to sustain the lower court's acceptance of the jury
waiver, the circuit court relied on Brady's limitation of Jackson. The
court cited Brady as declining to hold a guilty plea invalid "under the
Fifth Amendment whenever motivated by the defendant's desire to"
limit or lessen the possible penalty rather than face the highest penalty
allowed by law for the crime charged, which may include death." 3
The court claimed the facts here to be remarkably similar to those in
Brady. The court stated in both cases that the prosecution did not
threaten charging the defendant with crimes not supported by the
evidence, or to seek a more severe penalty in order to obtain leverage
during plea negotiations. 114 That being the case, the Third Circuit
held the defendant's waiver of a jury trial in exchange for the
prosecution's promise not to seek the death penalty valid.1 5 It seems
clear that if it was not for the death penalty, the defendant would have
108 See Parrish v. Fulcomer, 150 F.3d 326, 328 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that a
capital defendant who pleads guilty in exchange for the State's promise not to seek the
death penalty is a valid plea).
.09 See id. at 327-38.
"
0 See id. at 328.
See id. (explaining how the court treated this case as though it involved
plea-bargaining).
112 See Parrish, 150 F.2d 326, 328.
113 See id.




chosen to have his guilt determined by a jury and not by the judge.
Obviously, the possibility of the death penalty "needlessly
encouraged" the defendant to elect a bench trial.
1 16
In reaching their decisions, the numerous federal circuits and
district courts seemed to have been compelled to follow Brady's end-
run around Jackson. They were forced to ignore the Court's holding
in Jackson that the death penalty was inherently coercive and, as such,
needlessly encouraged guilty pleas."i7 The inducement to plead guilty
brought about by the death penalty was said to infringe upon a
criminal defendant's constitutional rights under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. This was the evil which Jackson was concerned with.
Granted, a capital defendant may still plead guilty if it was shown that
the plea was intelligent and voluntary. 18 However, Jackson was not
concerned with the standards for plea bargaining in capital cases, only
the effect of the death penalty on encouraging capital defendants to
incriminate themselves and waive a jury trial. It seems obvious that
the federal court's desire to maintain the death penalty while
subsequently encouraging the practice of plea bargaining has led them
to follow Brady and distinguish their cases from Jackson.
II. THE STATES AND THEIR CONFRONTATION WITH PLEA BARGAINING IN
CAPITAL CASES
States have had a difficult time adapting to the varying
decisions made by the Supreme Court concerning the volutariness of
116 It is inferred that a defendant would have exercised his Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial if the prosecution did not promise not to seek the death penalty
provided the defendant waived that right. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570,
583 (1968) (holding that the imposition of the death penalty only after a jury trial
"needlessly encourages" the waiver of certain constitutional rights, namely those under
the Fifth and Sixth Amendment).
117 See id.
118 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 (1969); see also Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (requiring that at defendant make an affirmative
showing on the record, an allocution, in order to ensure that a guilty plea was entered
intelligently and voluntarily); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (setting the
standard for guilty pleas by criminal defendants); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S.
459, 466 (1969).
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guilty pleas in capital cases. States were, and continue to be, eager to
construct death penalty statutes with plea-provisions that are in
accordance with Supreme Court mandates. State courts, like federal
courts, rely heavily on the practice of plea-bargaining, 119 and as a
result, have been anxious to develop capital punishment schemes that
would survive constitutional scrutiny.
In the wake of Jackson, many state courts felt obligated to
strike down or sever the plea provisions of their capital statutes.'
20
States appeared to be more concerned with sentencing schemes of
their capital statutes and not the guilty plea, per se. Therefore, unlike
the federal courts, they felt bound by Jackson when deciding issues
involving guilty pleas by capital defendants. Deciding that forcing
capital defendants to go to trial would be an unjust remedy, New
Jersey, Washington, Massachusetts and New Hampshire struck down
their death penalty statutes. 121  Therefore, it appears that the states,
and not the federal courts; feel much more obligated to follow
Jackson.
122
A. States that Followed Jackson
New Jersey appears to have taken the most drastic route, 123 In
State v. Funicello, the New Jersey Supreme Court reluctantly struck
119 See generally Guidorizzo, supra note 14.
120 See Eve Cary & Mary R. Falk, Death-Defying Feats: State Constitutional
Challenges to New York's Death Penalty, 4 J. L. & POL'Y 161 (1995) (stating that many
state courts in reliance on Jackson struck down the plea provisions of their death penalty
statutes or the entire statute itself); see also Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (stating that the
imposition of the death penalty only after a jury verdict needlessly chills the exercise of
certain constitutional rights).
121 Cary & Falk, supra note 120, at 199. State v. Funicello, 286 A.2d 55, 58-
59 (N.J. 1972), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972); State v. Frampton, 627 P.2d 922, 936
(1981); State v. Johnson, 595 A.D.2d 498 (N.H. 1991); Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz,
470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1994).
122 See Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201 (N.Y. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 2359 (1999) (determining the validity of the New York Capital Sentencing scheme
under the guise of Jackson, when such scheme allowed for the imposition of death only
after a jury's recommendation).
123 See Funicello, 286 A.2d 55, 58-59 (striking down New Jersey's death
penalty statute and all pending death sentences only after being ordered to do so by the
United States Supreme Court, which found that the New Jersey sentencing structure
contained the same constitutional infirmities declared unconstitutional in Jackson).
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down its entire death penalty statute and all pending death
sentences. 124  Under the New Jersey Death Penalty statute, the
punishment for First-Degree Murder is death, unless a jury
recommends life imprisonment. 125 A defendant may plead guilty to
the entire indictment, in which he would be sentenced to life
imprisonment or the applicable punishment for Second Degree
Murder. 126 A capital defendant could not waive a jury trial and be
tried by a judge causing the court to conclude that there was no Sixth
Amendment violation by the statute. 127 However, the violation was
found in the defendant's ability to plead guilty to the entire indictment
and receive a sentence other than death. 128 The court held that this
provision needlessly encouraged capital defendants to incriminate
themselves in order to avoid the death penalty.
129
Just three months after Jackson, also in 1968, the New Jersey
Supreme Court had upheld its death penalty statute in State v.
Forcella130 and only subsequently struck down the plea provision
three years later after being ordered by the United States Supreme
Court in Funiciello to do so. 131 In a somewhat reluctant concession,
the New Jersey Supreme Court aired its disagreement with the United
States Supreme Court in a concurring opinion.' 32 The New Jersey
Supreme Court understood how the sentencing scheme of the Federal
Kidnapping Statute impeded upon a capital defendant's right to a jury
trial. 33  However, the New Jersey court failed to see how such a
scheme violated the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
124 See id.
125 See id. at 57.
126 See id.
127 See Funiciello, 286 A.2d at 58.
128 See id.
129 See id.
130 See State v. Forcella, 245 A.2d 181 (1968).
131 See Funicello v. State, 403 U.S. 948 (1971) (reversing and remanding the
New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Forcella, ordering them to reconsider the
constitutionality of its sentencing procedures under its death penalty statute).
132 See Funicello, 286 A.2d 55, 59 (concurring opinion) (setting forth the
reasons why the New Jersey Supreme Court believed their state's death penalty statute
did not violate the Fifth Amendment and that the United States Supreme Court exceeded
their power in applying Jackson to this case).
133 See id. at 62.
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incrimination. 134 This disagreement was the basis for the court's
initial belief that New Jersey's capital plea provision was not
unconstitutional.135 New Jersey failed to see how the death penalty,
more than the possibility of receiving an increased prison term, was a
greater encouragement to a capital defendant to plea bargain. 36 In
conveying this disbelief, the New Jersey court referred to Jackson and
stated:
The majority opinion ... found also an invasion of the
Fifth Amendment, on the theme that there was
coercion to plead guilty. [The court] could not
understand, and still do not, how the Fifth Amendment
was involved, for a defendant did not have to plead
guilty to avoid the threat of the death sentence. The
coercion ran only to the choice of a trial with or
without a jury; it had nothing to do with the question
to defend or not to defend. 37
New Jersey conceded that the plea-bargaining provision of its
death penalty statute might be susceptible to attack under the Fifth
Amendment. 38 This was primarily because the death penalty could
not be imposed upon a plea of guilty.139  A sentence of life
imprisonment or that applicable to Murder in the Second Degree
could only be imposed after a plea of guilty to the entire indictment.140
Nonetheless, they believed such an extension of the Fifth Amendment
was excessive here.' 4' They went on to state how the same ethics
134 See id. (expressing their disagreement with the Supreme Court's decision
that the sentencing scheme of the Federal Kidnapping Statute violated the Fifth
Amendment).
135 See id. (expressing their disbelief that the death penalty could influence a
capital defendant to needlessly self-incriminate himself).
136 See Funiciello, 286 A.2d at 62 (trying to understand how their capital plea
provisions violated the Fifth Amendment).
137 1d.
138 See id. (conceding a possible successful attack upon their capital plea
provision if the Fifth Amendment was applicable here).
139 See id. (stating reasons why such an attack under the Fifth Amendment
might be possible). Compare United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
140 See Funiciello, 286 A.2d 55.
141 See id. at 62 (continuing to express disbelief that the Fifth Amendment
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should apply to plea-bargaining in all cases where a plea of guilty is
made in exchange for a more lenient sentence. 142  New Jersey
believed that forbidding plea bargaining in capital cases would likely
result in every defendant running the risk of death by going to trial,
increasing the number of executions.
143
In showing its disagreement with the Supreme Court's
decision to declare New Jersey's plea provision of its death penalty
statute unconstitutional, the New Jersey Supreme Court relied heavily
on Brady, Parker and Alford.144  Its argument was similar to how
many of the lower federal courts distinguished themselves from
Jackson. The New Jersey court cited the relevant sections of Jackson
and Brady that led them to believe that capital punishment and plea-
bargaining can coexist. 
145
For a defendant who sees slight possibility of
acquittal, the advantages of pleading guilty and
limiting the probable penalty are obvious ... that the
prevalence of guilty pleas is explainable does not
necessarily validate those pleas in a system which
produces them. But we cannot hold that it is
unconstitutional for the State to extend a benefit to a
defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to
the State and who demonstrates by this plea that he is
ready and willing to admit his crime .....14
Nevertheless, the New Jersey Supreme Court failed to
recognize what was discussed in Jackson.147 The Court in Jackson
was concerned that the death penalty would cause a capital defendant
who may not ordinarily plead guilty to do so, therefore, inferring that
was applicable to capital plea provisions, even after admitting possible violations).
142 See id. (suggesting that plea-bargaining in capital cases should not be
subject to a higher standard than that of other cases).
143 See id. See generally Jackson, 390 U.S. at 584.
144 See generally Funiciello, 286 A.2d 55.
141 See id.
146 See id. at 64 (forwarding a quote from Brady that led the New Jersey
Supreme Court to believe that capital punishment can coexist with plea bargaining).
147 See id. at 61 (explaining how the New Jersey Supreme Court failed to
address the true issue; that the death penalty is held to "needlessly encourage" guilty pleas
and jury waivers).
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death strongly induces guilty pleas. 148 The Supreme Court in Jackson
did not hold that all guilty pleas entered in exchange for a less severe
sentence are involuntary, but only those which were made in order to
escape the death penalty. 149 Despite their disagreement, New Jersey
followed the Supreme Court's order and struck the plea provisions
from its death penalty statute.150
The State of Washington also struck down the plea provision
of its capital punishment statute in State v. Frampton.'5' Under the
sentencing scheme in question, life imprisonment was the most severe
penalty a capital defendant could receive upon pleading guilty. 152 A
capital defendant could receive the death penalty only after a jury
trial.'53 In accordance with Jackson, the Washington Supreme Court
decided that the imposition of the death penalty only after a jury trial
"needlessly chilled" the imposition of a defendant's right to a jury
trial and not to plead guilty. 154  "Where, pursuant to statutory
procedure, the death penalty is imposed upon conviction following a
plea of not guilty and a trial, but is not imposed when there is a plea of
guilty, that statute is unconstitutional."' 5 5 Washington struck down its
death penalty's plea provision finding that it unnecessarily encouraged
defendants to waive both their right to a jury trial and their right not to
incriminate themselves. 156
New Hampshire, like Washington and New Jersey, also struck
down its death penalty statute for similar reasons. The statute in
question was held to place capital defendants at an impasse, forcing
them to choose whether to waive their right to a jury trial by pleading
guilty and thereby receiving the maximum penalty of life in prison or
148 See Funiciello, 286 A.2d 55, 61. (explaining how Jackson was only
concerned with plea-bargaining in capital cases, not all other cases).
149 See id.
150 See id.
151 627 P.2d 922 (Wash. 1981) (holding that the plea provisions of the
Washington Death Penalty statute violate a defendant's right against self-incrimination
and his or her right to demand a jury trial under the constitution).
152 See id. at 926 (inferring that under the Washington Statute, a capital
defendant could not be sentenced to death after a plea of guilty to a capital crime).
153 See id.
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to exercise their right to a jury trial, which if convicted, could result in
the death penalty. 157  The New Hampshire court relied heavily on
Jackson in deciding that its death penalty "needlessly chilled" the
exercise of the rights to a jury trial and against self-incrimination. 158
The court went on to state that a statute cannot allow for the death
penalty only upon a jury verdict convicting a defendant of capital
murder, while a defendant who pleads guilty to the same crime can
only be punished with life imprisonment. 159 The court further stated
that such a "selective death penalty", which discourages a capital
defendant from asserting his or her right to contest their guilt before a
jury, is in violation of both the Federal and New Hampshire
constitutions.'
60
Massachusetts followed the lead of New Hampshire and
Washington in 1994 when it declared the plea provisions of its death
penalty statute unconstitutional. 16 1  The Massachusetts statute, like
those struck down in New Hampshire and Washington, allowed the
imposition of the death penalty upon a jury verdict finding the
defendant guilty of capital murder. 162 In Commonwealth v. Colon-
Cruz, Massachusetts held that the plea provisions of its death penalty
statute violated the Massachusetts' state constitution.' 63  The
Massachusetts statute in question allowed for the imposition of the
death penalty only after a jury verdict. Therefore, if a capital
defendant pled guilty to capital murder, he or she could not receive the
death penalty.164 The court stated "Those who plead guilty in cases in
157 See State v. Johnson, 595 A.2d 498 (N.H. 1991) (holding the plea
provisions of the New Hampshire death penalty statute needlessly chilled the exercise of
certain constitutional rights by a capital defendant).
151 Id. at 501-502 (stating that such choices that lead a capital defendant to
plead guilty at the expense of exercising certain constitutional rights are unconstitutional).
159 See id.
160 See id. at 502.
161 See Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1994)
(holding that the Massachusetts' capital sentence scheme violated that state's
constitutions protection against self-incrimination and the right to a jury trial, when such a
scheme allowed for the imposition of the death penalty only upon a jury's
recommendation).
162 See id.; State v. Johnson, 595 A.D.2d 498 (N.H. 1991); State v. Frampton,
627 P.2d 922 (1981).
163 470 N.E.2d 116.
164 See id. (analogizing the Massachusetts death penalty statute to the Federal
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which death would be a possible sentence after trial thereby avoid the
risk of death."' 165  As a consequence, the Massachusetts' Supreme
Court found capital defendants to be discouraged from asserting their
right not to incriminate themselves as well as their right to demand a
jury trial. 166  The Court found that Massachusetts' capital plea
provision violated a defendant's state constitutional rights against self-
incrimination and his right to demand a jury trial.167
Even though its decision rested solely on state constitutional
grounds, the Massachusetts' Supreme Court felt obligated to discuss
Jackson.168 It concluded that a court cannot penalize a defendant for
exercising certain constitutional rights by imposing a much more
severe sentence than otherwise would have been imposed, and a
legislature may not authorize such penalization in enacting a scheme
which makes death the possible punishment upon a jury verdict for
First Degree Murder.' 69  The Massachusetts' Supreme Court stated
that Jackson supports this conclusion. 170  In Jackson, as in Colon-
Cruz, a capital defendant could only receive the death penalty after a
jury trial. 171Massachusetts took the issue of plea bargaining by capital
defendants to another level. The court concluded to give a defendant
"such alternatives, either to plead guilty or face the prospect of an
Kidnapping statute, which was declared unconstitutional in Jackson). Compare Jackson,
390 U.S. 570.
165 See Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116, 123 (inferring that death after trial leads
capital defendant's to plead guilty).
166 See id. at 124 (stating that death unnecessarily discourages defendants
from asserting necessary rights under the Massachusetts' constitution).
67 See id. at 123.
168 See id. at 130 (explaining how the decision rested solely on state
constitutional grounds, but finding it necessary to discuss the Supreme Court's decision in
Jackson to strengthen its reasoning).
169 See Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116, 128 (holding that a capital defendant
cannot be punished by a judge or the legislature through receiving a harsher punishment
when he exercises certain constitutional rights).
170 See id. (explaining that the Massachusetts Supreme Court found support in
Jackson for the conclusion that the death penalty needlessly punishes a capital defendant
whom chooses to exercise his right to a jury trial and his right not to plead guilty).
171 See id. (discussing the similarities that exist between the sentencing
scheme of the Massachusetts' death penalty statute and that of the Federal Kidnapping
statute, which was declared unconstitutional in Jackson).
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unduly harsh sentence in the event of a conviction, is coercive and,
therefore, involuntary as a matter of law.1 72  Consequently, the
Massachusetts' Supreme Court found the sentencing scheme of its
death penalty statute to violate its state constitution, in that it
penalized capital defendants who exercised their rights to a jury trial
and against self-incrimination with the threat of the death penalty. 
173
New Hampshire, Massachusetts and Washington all, in one
way or another, followed Jackson when addressing the
constitutionality of their death penalty statute's plea provisions.
Therefore, Massachusetts, Washington and New Hampshire all found
that where a capital defendant was able to receive the death penalty
only after a jury trial, the defendant was discouraged from exercising
his or her rights under either the Federal or their respective State
Constitutions.
B. States That Have Found Constitutional Paths Between the Death
Penalty and Plea Bargaining.
The inconsistencies present in the holdings of Jackson and
Brady have led to differing opinions among the states. Illinois,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Arkansas and Georgia have preferred
the "watered down" holding of Jackson.174  Each of these states
affirmed guilty pleas by capital defendants in much the same way the
federal circuit courts did. They relied heavily on the holding of Brady
in validating their findings.
For example, in Smith v. State,1 75 South Carolina stated that
172 See id. at 128.
173 See generally Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116, 128.
174 See Smith v. State, 179 S.E.2d 210 (S.C. 1971) (holding a guilty plea
made in order to escape the death penalty was not involuntary as a matter of law); see
also Robinson v. Arkansas, 752 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Ark. 1988) (finding that a defendant
made a knowing and intelligent guilty plea in order to escape the death penalty when that
defendant was aware of the nature of the charges and the possible penalties involved, and
that defendant gave sufficient factual details to the crimes charged); Commonwealth v.
Bhillips, 380 A.2d 1210 (Penn. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1067 (1979) (holding that
where a defendant faced the death penalty only after a jury trial, the fear of the possible
death sentence was insufficient to show the guilty plea was not entered into knowingly or
voluntarily).
171 179 S.E.2d 210 (holding that a plea of guilty, if voluntarily and
intelligently made, is valid regardless of whether it was only made to escape the death
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Brady had mitigated the holding of Jackson.176 That court went on to
hold that a capital defendant's fear that the death penalty may be
imposed after a jury trial did not render his or her plea involuntary as
a matter of law.177 South Carolina obviously accepted the rationale of
Brady in reaching this decision.
However, some states have constructed death penalty
sentencing schemes that pass constitutional muster. Tennessee and
Illinois, as well as many other states, allow for the imposition of the
death penalty upon an unnegotiated plea of guilty. 178 Nevada follows
the same formula. 179 The Supreme Court in Jackson actually
condoned this method. 180 Arkansas allows the trial judge, and not the
jury, to decide whether to impose the death penalty.' 8
These states narrowed their focus to analyzing the guilty plea
alone, therefore, justifying their choice to follow Brady over Jackson.
The construction of statutes that allow for capital punishment even
upon a plea of guilty appears to diminish the coercive nature of a
looming death sentence. No matter how a defendant's guilt is
decided, a jury should be allowed to decide whether to impose a
sentence of life imprisonment or death. This method removes the
option of pleading guilty solely to avoid the death from a capital
defendant, therefore, making the question of whether the death penalty
penalty).
176 See id. (stating that the holding of Jackson has been watered down by
subsequent Supreme Court decisions, namely those under Brady, Parker and Alford).
177 See id. (holding that the fear of the death penalty is not enough to render a
guilty plea involuntary).
178 See Tennessee v. Mann, 959 S.W.2d 503, 509 (Tenn. 1996), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 2376 (1998). See generally Illinois v. Walker, 419 N.E.2d 1167 (I1. 1981)
(discussing the issue of prosecutorial vindictiveness where a state sought the death
penalty after the defendant withdrew a previously entered guilty plea). Here, the
defendant was charged with murder and armed robbery as well as numerous other counts.
Defendant pled guilty to a term of years but was later allowed to withdraw that plea.
During trial, the defendant entered an unnegotiated guilty plea. A hearing was held to
determine a sentence, which resulted in the death penalty. Id. Here, the court remanded
the case because it appeared that the defendant was misled as to whether the prosecution
would seek the death penalty. Id.
179 See Conger v. Warden, 510 P.2d 1359, 1361 (Nev. 1973).
IS See 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968).
181 See Ruiz & Denton v. State, 630 S.W.2d 44, 45-46 (Ark. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982).
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alone led to an involuntary plea a non-issue. Nonetheless, many states
have not elected such a method.
III. THE ATTACK UPON THE PLEA PROVISION OF NEW YORK STATE'S
RECENTLY ENACTED DEATH PENALTY STATUTE.
In 1995, New York State reenacted the death penalty for
defendants convicted of First Degree Murder.1 82 Prior to 1995, New
York law prevented a capital defendant from pleading guilty.'
83
However, the newly enacted death penalty statute amended that
provision to now allow a capital defendant to plead guilty with both
the permission of the court and the prosecutor when the agreed
sentence is either life without parole or a prison term for First Degree
Murder.1 84 Under this scheme, a capital defendant who goes to trial
faces the death penalty, while one who pleads guilty can only receive
a maximum penalty of life imprisonment.
185
A. The Trial Level
Michael Shane Hale was indicted under Kings County
Indictment number 8776/96 for Murder in the First Degree, capital
murder, and numerous other crimes. The Kings County District
Attorney's Office filed notice of their intent to seek the death penalty.
This case was one of the first to be tried under New York's recently
enacted death penalty statute. Subsequently, upon motion by the
defendant, on June 6, 1997, the Supreme Court of Kings County, New
182 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 1997) (stating that a person is
guilty of Murder in the First Degree when he intentionally kills a person and that person
is either a police officer, peace officer, or under any of the additional nine subdivisions).
183 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 220.10 (5)(e), 220.30 (3)(b)(vii)
(McKinney 1993) (forbidding the entrance of guilty pleas by capital defendants).
184 See DEATH PENALTY ACT § 10, 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 4 (amending N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.10 (5)(e) (McKinney 1993)); see also DEATH PENALTY ACT § 11,
1995 N.Y. LAWS at 4 (amending N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.30 (3)(b)(vii) (McKinney
1993)).
185 For this reason it appears that the plea provisions of the New York death
penalty statute are susceptible to constitutional attack because they can be read to punish
capital defendants who elect to go to trial with the death penalty.
20001 727
728 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XVI
York declared the plea provisions of the New York death penalty
statute unconstitutional. 
186
In reaching this conclusion, Judge Tomei relied squarely on
Jackson's holding that such a sentencing scheme which allows for the
death penalty only after a jury verdict "needlessly penalized" the
assertion of the right to a trial by jury and the right against self-
incrimination. 87 It was apparent to the trial court that the sentencing
scheme of the New York death penalty statute was indistinguishable
to that of the Federal Kidnapping Statute, which was declared
unconstitutional in Jackson. The trial court observed that the statutory
provision, which governed plea-bargaining in capital cases, prevented
a death sentence upon a plea of guilty.188 In reaching the above
conclusion the court found that New York's plea bargaining scheme
rewarded a capital defendant who pled guilty, thereby waiving his or
her right to a jury trial and incriminating themselves. Judge Tomei
felt bound by Jackson and subsequently declared the plea provisions
of the New York death penalty statute unconstitutional.'89
The District Attorney quickly moved to reargue the issue
before the trial court. Prior to reargument, the District Attorney
offered the defendant the opportunity to plead guilty to Murder in the
Second Degree, Kidnapping in the Second Degree and Robbery in the
First Degree in exchange for a sentence of fifty years to life.' 90 In
accordance with his decision of June 6, 1997, Judge Tomei refused to
accept the plea bargain unless the District Attorney withdrew notice of
186 See New York.v. Hale, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457, 478 (1997) (holding the statute
unconstitutional because the capital defendant may plead guilty only to a sentence other
than death).
117 See id at 479 (interpreting the holding of Jackson applicable to such
sentencing schemes which allows a defendant to plead guilty only to a sentence other than
death, when the death penalty could only be imposed after a jury trial).
18 See id.
189 See Hale, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457, 479-480 (finding those plea provisions of
New York's death penalty statute unconstitutional in so far as it needlessly encouraged
defendants not to exercise their right to a jury trial and not to plead guilty).
190 See Hynes v. Tomei, 666 N.Y.S.2d 687, 689 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); see
also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1993) (declaring that a person is guilty of
murder in the second degree when he or she either intentionally kills another person, or
acting with a depraved indifference to human life, he or she causes the death of another
person).
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intent to seek the death penalty. 9' The District Attorney refused.
Subsequently, the District Attorney appealed seeking to prevent Judge
Tomei from enforcing his order, which declared the plea provisions
unconstitutional. 192 If the appellate court chose not to prevent Judge
Tomei from enforcing his order, the District Attorney alternatively
asked the court to declare the selected provisions not
unconstitutional. 1
93
B. The Appellate Level
The appellate court declared the plea provisions of New
York's death penalty statute not unconstitutional, thereby reversing
the trial court.' 9 4 The court found itself confronted with the issue of
whether the New York Criminal Procedure Law, which enables a
defendant to avoid the possibility of death by pleading guilty,
unconstitutionally penalizes a capital defendant's right to a jury
trial. 95 Because Judge Tomei, at the trial level, based his decision
solely on Jackson, the appellate court found it necessary to show New
York's plea bargaining scheme was different from the sentencing
scheme of the Federal Kidnapping Statute struck down in Jackson.
The first major distinction rested on the fact that a capital
defendant faced a bifurcated trial.' 96 In New York, a capital trial
consists of both a guilt phase and a penalty phase.' 97 The defendant's
guilt and sentence are decided separately by the same jury. 198  The
appellate court advanced that at the guilt phase of a trial, the capital
defendant maintained all of his constitutional rights.' 99 While at the
guilt phase, the defendant is able to present any evidence that is
'9' See Hynes, 666 N.Y.S. 2d at 689.
192 See id. (explaining the grounds of the Kings County District Attorney's
appeal).
"' See id.
194 See id. at 687.
195 id.
196 See id. at 690-691.
197 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney 1997) (providing for a
separate guilt phase of the trial after capital defendant is found guilty by a jury of Murder
in the First Degree).
198 See id.
'9' See Hynes, 666 N.Y.S. 2d at 691.
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connected to any mitigating factors, which may be advanced.2 °° In
deciding whether to impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment,
the jury is to weigh these mitigating factors against the aggravating
factors. 20 1 This distinction, however, appears to make little difference.
Regardless of what type of trial a court imposes, the death penalty can
still only be imposed after a jury trial. Thus, a capital defendant
would still have to plead guilty in order to erase any possibility of
receiving the death penalty.
20 2
The second distinction, the one the appellate court believed to
be the most important difference between the New York scheme and
Jackson, is that the defendant in Jackson was able to plead guilty as of
right.20 3 While under the New York scheme, a capital defendant could
not plead guilty to Murder in the First Degree without the consent of
both the prosecutor and the court. The court advanced that the
defendant in Jackson "could avoid the death penalty through his own
unilateral action., 20 4 However, does this amount of control that a
defendant has over the plea-bargaining process negate the influence
that the death penalty has over him in making his decision whether to
plead guilty? The appellate court obviously found the necessity of the
prosecutor's consent to the plea bargain convincing in declaring
Jackson inapplicable, 20 5 because according to the court, Jackson did
not involve the issue surrounding the requirement of the prosecutor's
consent to a plea of guilty to First Degree Murder.20 6
In addition, the New York appellate court stated that the
Supreme Court's decisions in Brady, Parker and Alford limited the
scope of Jackson and, therefore, did not reach the New York
scheme. 20 7 The appellate court followed the notion that Brady limited
200 See id.
201 See id. at n.3.
202 A bifurcated trial may still encourage a capital defendant to plead guilty in
order to avoid the death penalty, when the only avenue towards the death penalty is after
such a trial.
203 See Hynes, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 691.
204 See id. (arguing that normally a defendant could plead guilty without the
consent of the prosecutor). In New York, a capital defendant does not have such
unilateral power because her or she must have the consent of the prosecutor. Id.
205 See id. at 690.
206 See id.
207 See id. at 691 (stating that several subsequent decisions by the Supreme
730 [Vol. XVI
20001 LIFE OR DEATH 731
the scope of Jackson in construing it to hold a plea of guilty made out
in fear of the death penalty was not necessarily invalid.20 8 The court
further urged that Alford is binding, so far as it held a plea of guilty
entered into solely to avoid the death penalty is not necessarily
coerced under the Fifth Amendment. 20 9 For the above reasons, the
appellate court found the plea provisions of New York's death penalty
statute not unconstitutional.1 0 Immediately thereafter, the defendant
appealed to the New York State Court of Appeals, that state's highest
court, to resolve the issue.
C. New York's Final Decision
The Court of Appeals released its decision on December 22,
1998. In a unanimous opinion, the Court felt bound by Jackson and
declared the sentencing scheme of its death penalty statute
unconstitutional, reversing the appellate court.21' Chief Justice Kaye
stated that the New York law provided two levels of penalty for the
crime of First Degree Murder.212 These levels are death for those who
assert their right to a jury trial and life for those who plead guilty or
choose a bench trial.213
Chief Justice Kaye found that none of the differences that the
appellate court relied upon were of any constitutional significance.214
First, the court found no difference in the New York requirement that
both the prosecutor and the court must consent to a plea by a capital
defendant, since Jackson also required the consent of the trial court.215
Court "made it clear that its holding in Jackson does not have the broad application
ascribed to it by Justice Tomei").
208 See id. at 692.
209 See id. (urging the holding of Alford, Parker and Brady have limited the
scope of Jackson).
210 See id. at 693 (relying on the Supreme Court's limitation of Jackson
through Brady and other subsequent decisions).
211 Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201 (N.Y. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
2359 (1999).
212 See id. at 1203.
213 See id. (declaring that the death penalty could only be imposed by those
defendants who elected a jury trial).
214 See id.
215 See Hynes, 706 N.E.2d at 1205 (finding that a capital defendant did not
have such unilateral power to plead guilty under either New York Law or the Federal
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She also found that New York's requirement of a bifurcated trial did
not significantly separate it from the grasp of Jackson.216 The District
Attorney, however, argued that once a jury convicts a defendant of
First Degree Murder, he or she may still plead to a prison sentence at
the guilt phase, which is a significant difference from Jackson.217 The
court dismissed this by stating that the possibility of the death penalty
still exists because a capital defendant does not know prior to trial
whether a term of years will be offered at the penalty phase.218
Nonetheless, C'hief Justice Kaye did not strike down New
York's entire death penalty statute.219  Rather, the Chief Justice
severed the plea provisions from the statute, thereby removing the
possibility of plea bargaining in a capital case while notice of intent to
seek the death penalty is pending.220 This decision commanded that a
capital defendant cannot plead guilty while notice of intent to seek the
death penalty is in effect, thereby forcing all to go to trial.22' The
Court acknowledged that the prohibition of plea bargaining in capital
cases would decrease the opportunities of a capital defendant to avoid
death.222 Even before this decision, prosecutors in New York would
accept guilty pleas from a First Degree Murder defendant in exchange
223for a term of years. These plea bargains were promised on the
condition that the district attorney would not seek the death penalty.224
Such a practice is still permissible after the Court's ruling. Therefore,
Kidnapping statute in Jackson); compare United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968)
(finding the sentencing structure of the Federal Kidnapping statute unconstitutional).
216 See Hynes, 706 N.E.2d at 1206-1207.
217 See id. (declaring that a bifurcated trial "does not eliminate the 'chilling
effect' on a defendant's constitutional right to maintain innocence and demand a jury
trial").
218 See id.
219 See Hynes, 706 N.E.2d at 1208 & n.7.
220 See id. (declaring N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 220.10(5)(e) and
220.30(3)(b) unconstitutional and severing them from the Death Penalty statute).
221 See id. at 1208-1209 (preventing guilty pleas by capital defendants while
notice of intent to seek the death penalty is pending because they found the New York
death penalty sentencing scheme encouraged guilty pleas and jury waivers).
222 See id. at 1209 (inferring that a defendant indicted for First Degree
Murder may plead guilty prior to the district attorney deciding to seek the death penalty).
223 Steven W. Fisher, Impact of "Hynes v. Tomei" on Capital Litigation,
N.Y.L.J., MAR. 3, 1999, at 1, 36.
224 See id
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the District Attorney's promise not to seek the death penalty in
exchange for a guilty plea still provides a First Degree Murder
defendant with an incentive to plead guilty.225  The court itself
acknowledged this deficit in its ruling. In any case, the death penalty
is never removed from the list of possible sentences one indicted with
First Degree Murder faces. The Kings County District Attorney
applied for a writ of certiori to the United States Supreme Court. The
Court declined to hear the case on June 14, 1999.226
D. The Impact of the New York Decision
The decision was a small victory for opponents of the death
penalty, but left little solace for those currently faces capital murder
charges in New York. In their zeal to have the court strike down the
entire New York capital punishment statute, they left their clients
faced with the increased chance of obtaining a death sentence, by, in
effect, forcing them to go to trial. Imagine telling Michael Shane
Hale, the defendant in Hynes, "hey -Mike - great news - we won
before the Court of Appeals; but the bad news is, now you are on trial
for your life." Fortunately for Hale, the District Attorney consented
to Hale pleading guilty to Murder in the Second Degree,
Kidnapping in the Second Degree, and Robbery in the First Degree
in exchange for an aggregate sentence of fifty years to life.2 27 Hale
pleaded guilty pursuant to the plea agreement and was sentenced
by Judge Tomei to a term of fifty years to life in an upstate New
York prison.
The death penalty still carries influence in plea negotiation
with those indicted for Murder in the First Degree. A prosecutor may
induce a capital defendant to plead guilty by threatening to file a
notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Once a district attorney
225 See id. (suggesting that even though a defendant may not plead guilty
while death penalty notice is pending, this does not prevent a possible capital defendant
from pleading guilty prior to the filing of the notice, thereby never removing the
incentives that the death penalty invokes in plea bargaining).
226 Hynes v. Tomei, 119 S. Ct. 2386 (1999).
227 Pursuant to the plea agreement, the charges of Murder in the First Degree
and the Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty remained in effect should Hale's
conviction be overturned on appeal.
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declares his or her intent to seek death, the defendant is prohibited
from pleading guilty. However, a prosecutor may always withdraw
the notice of intent to seek the death penalty. The court's ruling in
Hynes has done little to prevent the use of the death penalty by the
prosecution as a plea bargaining tool. In reality, a defendant indicted
for capital murder never truly escapes the possibility of execution. 8
CONCLUSION
New York law should be modified to allow a jury to decide
the punishment of a capital defendant, regardless of how guilt was
determined. 229  A capital defendant could enter an unconditional
guilty plea to Murder in the First Degree. A jury could then be
impaneled to decide on a sentence. That sentence could be either a
term of years or death. The guilty plea could then be presented to the
jury by the defendant as a mitigating factor. This method appears to
make the question of whether the -death penalty needlessly encouraged
a capital defendant to plead guilty a non-issue. The defendant would,
in effect, plead guilty not knowing whether he or she will be
sentenced to death or a term of years.
228 On March 29, 2000, a couple of days before this note went to publication,
the New York Court of Appeals heard arguments on the issue of whether a capital
defendant may plead guilty prior to a district attorney filing notice of intent to seek the
death penalty, thereby avoiding execution. Francois v. Dolan, 693 N.Y.S.2d 198 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1999), leave to appeal granted by, 719 N.E.2d 926 (N.Y. 1999); John Caher,
Plea to Preempt Death Penalty is Argued, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 30, 2000, at 1.
229 During New York's 1994 Gubernatorial campaign, then candidate George
Pataki, a Republican, promised to reinstate the death penalty if elected. In the years
preceding Pataki's election, the death penalty was passed by the Republican controlled
New York legislature numerous times only to be vetoed by then incumbent Governor
Mario Cuomo, a Democrat. Shortly after being sworn into office in January 1995,
Governor Pataki followed through on his campaign promise by signing the death penalty
into law. It would appear that New York politicians created a death penalty statute that
they hoped would not survive legal challenges. They enacted a death penalty statute to
please the electorate, while secretly hoping no one would be executed under it. If they
really wanted to enact a legally sound death penalty statute, they would have followed the
lead of numerous other states that allow for death even upon a plea of guilty. To this day,
they have yet to modify the statute to allow for such a procedure. Against their true
hopes, the Court of Appeals only severed the plea provisions and not the whole statute.
At least not yet.
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In its opinion, the Court of Appeals suggested that allowing
for the imposition of the death penalty upon a plea of guilty was a
workable alternative. 230 However, this solution was not available to
the court because New York law does not provide procedures for
impaneling a jury solely to determine punishment after a guilty plea in
capital cases.23 ' This method was also condoned by the Supreme
Court in Jackson.232 A capital defendant may plead guilty and still be
sentenced to death in almost all of the other thirty-nine states which
allow for the death penalty.233 It is the most plausible way to allow the
death penalty and plea bargaining to coexist.
Plea-bargaining in death penalty cases has led to differing
decisions among the state and federal courts. Courts find plea-
bargaining necessary for relieving their congested dockets as well as
for the quick imposition of punishment. In their desire to maintain the
practice of plea-bargaining, courts have been struggling with how to
address the issue in capital cases. Almost all courts have
acknowledged the increased influence that the death penalty plays in
the mind of a capital defendant during the plea-bargaining process.
The death penalty is a beloved tool of prosecutors, even when
they do not intend to use it to execute people.234 A person's will to
live can cause him or her to sacrifice his or her freedom and enter into
a plea agreement with prosecutors no matter how certain or remote the
possibility of receiving the death penalty may be. It is this desire to
survive that has led to such debate over whether our criminal justice
system can foster both plea-bargaining and the death penalty. Can a
capital defendant while looking death in the face maintain enough
composure to gamble with his life? Why not plead guilty and save
your life, instead of going to trial and facing the possibility of death?
230 Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201, 1207 (1998).
231 Id.
232 See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968).
233 See Alan Finer, State's Top Court Voids Plea System for Capital Cases,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1998, at Al. Capital defendants usually negotiate with prosecutors
for a sentence of a term of years, therefore, this method is rarely chosen. Id.
234 Russell Neufeld, Problems Defending under New York's Death Penalty
Law, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 143 (1995) (suggesting that the death penalty is a much prized
weapon of prosecutors in the plea bargaining process, even when a prosecutor never
intends to use the death penalty to execute a defendant).
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As you can see, the courts have had a hard time finding a
middle ground on this issue. In a system, which relies on the plea-
bargaining process to alleviate its ever-growing docket, there has been
much desire to apply it to all types of cases. Our system presumes a
criminal defendant innocent until proven guilty and affords him or her
numerous constitutional rights in order to ensure that only the guilty
are punished. A waiver of all these rights must be given the highest
amount of scrutiny. It is the level of influence given to the death
penalty applied in the various courts that has led to different
outcomes. Will our criminal justice system ever find a sufficient way
to apply plea-bargaining in capital cases?
Christopher Solgan
